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Cooperation,
reciprocity and community governance Ben-Ner Avner,
Putterman Louis [1998], Economics, Values, and Organization,
Cambridge University Press, March 1998. Ben-Ner A.,
Putterman L. [1999], Reciprocity in a Two Part Dictator Game,
Working Paper, http://econ.pstc.brown.edu/faculty/putterman/working/working.html Reciprocity
is a widely observed phenomenon for which evolutionary foundations are
posited. We conduct a dictator game in which recipients in an initial
game become dictators in a second game. The amount sent by those sending
back to the person from whom they received some or no dollars is strongly
correlated with the amount received by them, although the interaction
is one time and zero sum in nature. No such correlation between amounts
sent and received is exhibited when second round dictators are instead
paired with new partners. Intelligence and personality test results,
gender, and other characteristics also help to predict sending behavior.
(JEL C91, A13, D00) Falk, Armin
and Urs Fischbacher, [1998], "A Theoy of Reciprocity", Working
Paper, University of Zurich. Falk, Armin,
Ernst Fehr, Urs Fischbacher [2001], "Driving Forces of Informal
Sanctions", Working Paper, http://www.iew.unizh.ch/home/falk/ Informal
sanctions are a major determinant of a society’s social capital because
they are key to the enforcement of implicit agreements and social norms.
Yet, little is known about the driving forces behind informal sanctions.
We systematically examine the determinants of informal sanctions by
a large number of experiments. Our experiments allow us to identify
the relative importance of three major potential factors: (i) strategic
sanctioning for selfish reasons, (ii) non-strategic sanctions driven
by spitefulness, and (iii) non-strategic sanctions that are driven by
the violation of fairness principles. In addition, the observed sanctioning
patterns provide insights into the relevance of different fairness principles.
Our findings show that the violation of fairness principles is the most
important driving force of sanctions but, in addition, a non-negligible
part of the sanctions is driven by spitefulness. We find surprisingly
little evidence for strategic sanctions that are imposed to create future
material benefits. While non-strategic sanctions are of major importance
in our experiments, strategic sanctions seem to play a negligible role.
Within the class of fairnessdriven sanctions the motive to harm those
who committed unfair actions seems most important. Falk,
Armin, Ernst Fehr, Urs Fischbacher [2000], Testing Theories of Fairness
- Intentions Matter, working paper, http://www.iew.unizh.ch/home/falk/ Recently
developed models of fairness can explain a wide variety of seemingly
contradictory facts. The most controversial and yet unresolved issue
in the modeling of fairness preferences concerns the behavioral relevance
of fairness intentions. Intuitively, fairness intentions seem to play
an important role in economic relations, political struggles and legal
disputes. Yet, so far there is little rigorous evidence supporting this
intuition. In this paper we provide clear and unambiguous experimental
evidence for the behavioral relevance of fairness intentions. Our results
indicate that the attribution of fairness intentions is important both
in the domain of negatively reciprocal behavior and in the domain of
positively reciprocal behavior. This means that reciprocal behavior
cannot be fully captured by equity models that are exclusively based
on preferences over the distribution of material payoffs. Models that
take into account players’ fairness intentions and distributional preferences
are consistent with our data while models that focus exclusively on
intentions or on the distribution of material payoffs are not. Fehr Ernst,
Schmidt K. [2001], "Theories of Fairness and Reciprocity - Evidence
and Economic Applications", forthcoming in: M. Dewatripont, L.
Hansen and St. Turnovsky (Eds.), Advances in Economics and Econometrics
- 8th World Congress, Econometric Society Monographs. (with K. Schmidt),
http://www.iew.unizh.ch/home/fehr/ Most
economic models are based on the self interest hypothesis that assumes
that all people are exclusively motivated by their material self-interest.
In recent years experimental economists have gathered overwhelming evidence
that systematically refutes the self-interest hypothesis and suggests
that many people are strongly motivated by concerns for fairness and
reciprocity. Moreover, several theoretical papers have been written
showing that the observed phenomena can be explained in a rigorous and
tractable manner. These theories in turn induced a new wave of experimental
research offering additional exciting insights into the nature of preferences
and into the relative performance of competing theories of fairness.
The purpose of this paper is to review these recent developments, to
point out open questions, and to suggest avenues for future research. Fehr E.,
Gächter S. [1997], "Reciprocity as a Contract Enforcement
Device: Experimental Evidence", Econometrica 65,4 (July),
p.833-860. Joel
Guttman Guttman J. [2000],
"On the Evolutionary stability of preferences for reciprocity",
European Journal of Political Economy, 16, p.31-50. Forsythe, Robert,
Joel L. Horowitz, N.E. Savin and Martin Sefton, [1994], “Fairness in
Simple Bargaining Experiments”, Games and Economic Behavior 6:
347-69. Clark Kenneth,
Martin Sefton [2001], "The Sequential Prisoner's Dilemma: Evidence
on Reciprocation", Economic Journal 111, 51-68. http://www.nottingham.ac.uk/economics/cedex/papers/spd.htm We
investigate how fairness concerns influence individual behaviour in
social dilemmas. Using a Sequential Prisoner's Dilemma experiment we
analyse the extent to which cooperation is conditional on first-mover
cooperation, repetition, economic incentives, subject pool (UK vs. US)
and gender. We find the most important variable influencing cooperation
is the first-mover's choice, supporting the argument that cooperative
behaviour in social dilemmas reflects reciprocation rather than unconditional
altruism. However, we also find that cooperation decreases with repetition,
and reciprocation falls as its material cost rises. Todd
L. Cherry, Department of Economics, Appalachian State University, Boone,
NC 28608-2051, USA Cherry Todd
L. [2001], "Mental accounting and other-regarding behavior: Evidence
from the lab", Journal of Economic Psychology, Volume 22,
Issue 5, October 2001, Pages 605-615. This
paper uncovers a key determinant of the other-regarding behavior that
permeates bargaining experiments. Examining a one-shot dictator game
that has the first-mover dictate the split of an amount of money, dictators
acting over earned money exhibited self-interested behavior in 76% of
bargains. This result stands in stark contrast to the baseline experiment
in which dictators acting over allocated money displayed self-interested
behavior in only 26% of bargains. Self-interested behavior appeared
at greater levels using an earnings protocol than any previous variation
of the dictator game. While the distinction between earned and unearned
wealth is likely context specific, the earnings protocol may be an important
option for future laboratory research. Specifically, the earnings protocol
may provide a closer correspondence between the laboratory and individual
choices over personal assets. Ishaya T.,
Macaulay L. [1999], "The Role of Trust in Virtual Teams", Electronic Journal of Organizational
Virtualness, Vol. 1 No. 1 Page:
140-157, http://www.virtual-organization.net Cooper Russell,
DeJong Douglas V., Forsythe Robert, Ross Thomas W. [1996], "Cooperation
without Reputation: Experimental Evidence from Prisoner's Dilemma Games",
Games and Economic Behavior, Vol. 12, No. 2, February 1, 1996pp. 187-218 http://www.idealibrary.com/servlet/artid/game.1996.0013 This
paper investigates cooperative play in prisoner's dilemma games by designing
an experiment to evaluate the ability of two leading theories of observed
cooperation: reputation building and altruism. We analyze both one-shot
and finitely repeated games to gauge the importance of these theories.
We conclude that neither altruism nor reputation building alone can
explain our observations. The reputation model is inconsistent with
play in both one-shots and finitely repeated games while the model with
altruism is unable to explain observed play in the finitely repeated
games. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C72, C92.
Macy Michael
W. and Andreas Flache [2002], "Learning Dynamics in Social Dilemmas",
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, February, 2002. http://www.people.cornell.edu/pages/mwm14/ Macy Michael
W. and Robert Willer [2002], "From Factors to Actors", Annual
Review of Sociology, Vol. 28, 2002. Macy Michael
W. and John Skvoretz [1998], "The Evolution of Trust and Cooperation
between Strangers: A Computational Model", American Sociological
Review, October, 1998. Macy Michael
W. and David Strang [2001], "'In Search of Excellence': Fads, Success
Stories, and Adaptive Emulation", American Journal of Sociology,
2001. Macy Michael
W., James Kitts, and Andreas Flache [1997], "The Weakness of Strong
Ties II: Collective Action Failure in a Self-Organizing Social Network",
Presented at American Sociological Association, Toronto, August 11,
1997 Akiyama E.,
Kaneko K. [2000], Dynamical Systems Game Theory : A New
Approach to the problem of Social Dilemma, Working Paper, Santa
Fe Institute The
"social dilemma" is a problem inherent in forming and maintaining
cooperation among selfish individuals, and is of fundamental importance
in the biological and social sciences. From the viewpoint of traditional
game theory, the existence of the social dilemma necessarily implies
degeneration into selfish behavior as the numbers of members in a community
increases, unless there exists some external power. In the real world,
however, cooperation is often formed and maintained merely through mutual
interactions, without the influence of an external power. To answer
questions concerning appearance and maintenance of cooperative behavior
in societies, we study what we call the "Lumberjacks" Dilemma
(LD) game as an application of the dynamical systems (DS) game theory
presented in Ref. [1], which can naturally deal with the dynamic aspects
of games. Dynamical processes that lead to the formation and maintenance
of cooperation, which is often observed in the real communities, are
realized in our model. The mechanism underlying this formation and maintenance
is explained from the DS game point of view, by analyzing the functional
dependence of the attractor of the game dynamics on a parameter characterizing
the strategy. It is demonstrated that norms for cooperation are formed
as strategies that are manifested as specific attractors of game dynamics.
The change in the stability of this cooperative behavior as the number
of members increases is also discussed. Finally, the relevance of our
study to cooperation seen in the real world is discussed. http://www.santafe.edu/~eizo/Papers/index.html Clark Kenneth,
Stephen Kay and Martin Sefton [1997], "When Are Nash Equilibria
Self-Enforcing? An Experimental Analysis", International Journal
of Game Theory http://www.nottingham.ac.uk/economics/cedex/papers/cks.htm We
investigate the effect of non-binding pre-play communication in experiments
with simple two-player coordination games. We reproduce the results
of other studies in which play converges to a Pareto-dominated equilibrium
in the absence of communication, and communication moves outcomes in
the direction of the Pareto-dominant equilibrium. However, we provide
new results which show that the effectiveness of communication is sensitive
to the structure of payoffs. Our results support an argument put forward
by Aumann: agreements to play a Nash equilibrium are fragile when players
have a strict preference over their opponent's strategy choice. We also
find that informative communication does not necessarily lead to the
Pareto-dominant equilibrium. Varian H.,
Andreoni J. [1999], "Pre-Play Contracting in the Prisoners'
Dilemma", Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences,
Vol. 96, pp. 10933–10938, September 1999, http://www.sims.berkeley.edu/~hal/people/hal/papers.html Matthew
O. Jackson and Simon Wilkie Matthew O.
Jackson M.O., Wilkie S., [2000], Endogenous Games and Mechanisms:
Side Payments Among Players, Working Paper , September 2000 We
characterize the outcomes of games when players may make binding offers
of strategy-contingent side payments before the game is played. This
does not always lead to efficient outcomes, despite complete information
and costless contracting. The characterizations are illustrated in a
series of examples, including voluntary contribution public good games,
Cournot and Bertrand oligopoly, principal-agent problems, and commons
games, among others. Scharlemann
Jörn P. W., Catherine C. Eckel, Alex Kacelnika, Rick K. Wilson [2001],
"The value of a smile: Game theory with a human face", Journal
of Economic Psychology, Volume 22, Issue 5, October 2001, Pages
617-640. Many
economists and biologists view cooperation as anomalous: animals (including
humans) that pursue their own self-interest have superior survival odds
to their altruistic or cooperative neighbors. However, in many situations
there are substantial gains to the group that can achieve cooperation
among its members, and to individuals who are members of those groups.
For an individual, the key to successful cooperation is the ability
to identify cooperative partners. The ability to signal and detect the
intention to cooperate would be a very valuable skill for humans to
posses. Smiling
is frequently observed in social interactions between humans, and may
be used as a signal of the intention to cooperate. However, given that
humans have the ability to smile falsely, the ability to detect intentions
may go far beyond the ability to recognize a smile. In the present study,
we examine the value of a smile in a simple bargaining context. 120
subjects participate in a laboratory experiment consisting of a simple
two-person, one-shot "trust" game with monetary payoffs. Each
subject is shown a photograph of his partner prior to the game; the
photograph is taken from a collection that includes one smiling and
one non-smiling image for each of 60 individuals. These photographs
are also rated by a separate set of subjects who complete a semantic
differential survey on affective and behavioral interpretations of the
images. Results
lend some support to the prediction that smiles can elicit cooperation
among strangers in a one-shot interaction. Other characteristics of
faces also appear to elicit cooperation. Factor analysis of the survey
data reveals an important factor, termed "cooperation", which
is strongly related to trusting behavior in the game. This factor is
correlated with smiling, but is somewhat more strongly predictive of
behavior than a smile alone. In addition, males are found to be more
cooperative, especially towards female images, whereas females are least
cooperative towards female images. Volker
Grossmann : Socioeconomic Institute, University of Zurich, R€amisstrasse
62, CH-8001 Zurich, Switzerland Grossmann
Volker [2002], "Is it rational to internalize the personal norm
that one should reciprocate?", Journal of Economic Psychology,
Volume 23, Issue 1 (Feb-2002) This
paper shows in a simple game-theoretic model that it can be rational
for non-altruistic individuals to adopt a personal value-based norm
to reciprocate. Moreover, it is argued that such a behavioral commitment
is feasible and thus self-binding. Reciprocal behavior has become a
stylized fact in experimental labor markets. Our analysis suggests that
in laboratory experiments ‘‘workers’’ may provide high effort either
because they adopted the norm to behave reciprocally fair or because
they fear to ‘‘work’’ with an ‘‘employer’’ who adopted the norm to punish
unkind behavior. Gunnthorsdottir
A., K. McCabe, V. Smith [2002], "Using the Machiavellianism instrument
to predict trustworthiness in a bargaining game", Journal of
Economic Psychology, Volume 23, Issue 1 (Feb-2002) Game-theoretic
experiments have revealed substantial individual differences where the
game allows for off-equilibrium behavior such as trust and reciprocity.
We explore the personality psychology and decision making literatures
and conclude that these individual differences are likely to be mediated
by differential emotional arousal. We argue that Christie and Geis’s
Machiavellianism scale (Mach-IV) is an instrument that allows the identification
of types who vary in cooperativeness. We use that test to predict the
behavior of participants in a two-person one-shot constituent game in
which subjects face a choice between trust and distrust, and between
reciprocation (trustworthiness) and defection. We find that the Mach-IV
scale does not predict trusting behavior. It does, however, predict
reciprocity. Over one half of those who score low to average on the
scale reciprocate trust. High scorers overwhelmingly defect when it
is to their advantage to do so. Miriam
Tatzel: Empire State College, State University of New York, 240 North
Main Street, New City, NY 10956, USA Tatzel Miriam
[2002], "'Money worlds' and well-being: An integration of money
dispositions, materialism and price-related behavior", Journal
of Economic Psychology, Volume 23, Issue 1 (Feb-2002) Psychological
aspects of money attitudes, material values, and spending are brought
together in an integrated model of consumption patterns. Tightness with
money combined with high materialism predicts value-seeking bargain
hunting; looseness with money combined with high materialism predicts
price-seeking conspicuous spending; tightness with money combined with
low materialism predicts price aversion and reluctance to spend; and
looseness with money combined with low materialism predicts spending
on experiences rather than things. Being overly tight with money, overly
loose, materialistic, or overly concerned with financial success are
all associated with lowered well-being. Andreoni,
James, [1995], “Cooperation in Public-Goods Experiments: Kindness or
Confusion,” American Economic Review 85: 891- 904. Martin Sefton,
Robert Shupp and James Walker [2000], "The Effects of Rewards and
Sanctions in Provision of Public Goods", working paper,
July, 2000. http://www.nottingham.ac.uk/ economics/cedex/papers/index.html#work We examine how opportunities to reward and sanction
other group members affect resource allocations in a voluntary contribution
mechanism experiment. Rewards represent a zero sum transfer from participants
giving to those receiving rewards. Sanctions represent a net loss, a
cost to both the participant giving and the participant receiving the
sanction. In our baseline treatment, without opportunities to reward
or sanction, we reproduce the results of other studies: group allocations
to the public good are less than fully efficient and decline with repetition.
When we allow participants to reward other group members after observing
allocation decisions, group allocations temporarily increase before
falling to the same level as in the baseline. With opportunities to
sanction, group allocations are stable and higher than in the baseline.
The highest group allocations are observed in a treatment in which participants
can use sanctions as well as rewards. Initially, earnings exceed those
in the baseline when subjects have opportunities to reward, or opportunities
to use both rewards and sanctions; earnings are below the baseline when
participants have an opportunity to sanction, but not reward. Over the
course of multiple decision rounds, however, earnings in the four treatments
tend to converge. By the last round, the earnings difference between
the four treatments is minimal. Kyung Hwan
Baik, In-Gyu Kim, Sunghyun Na [2001], "Bidding for a group-specific
public-good prize", Journal of Public Economics, Volume
82, Issue 3, December 2001, Pages 415-429. We
examine the equilibrium effort levels of individual players and groups
in a context in which two groups compete with each other to win a group-specific
public-good prize, the players choose their effort levels simultaneously
and independently, and the winning group is determined by the selection
rule of all-pay auctions. We first prove nonexistence of a pure-strategy
Nash equilibrium, and then construct a mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium.
At the Nash equilibrium, the only active player in each group is a player
whose valuation for the prize is the highest in that group; all the
other players expend zero effort; and the equilibrium effort levels
depend solely on two values: the highest valuation for the prize in
each group. Haag Matthew,
Lagunoff Roger [2000], Social Norms, Local Interaction, and Neighborhood
Planning, Working Pper, July 11, 2000 http://www.courses.fas.harvard.edu/~ec2052/syllabus/ExtendedReadings/ This
paper examines optimal social linkage when each individual's repeated
interaction with each of his neighbors creates spillovers. Each individuals'
discount factor is randomly determined. A planner chooses a local interaction
network or neighborhood design before the discount factors are realized.
Each individual then plays a repeated Prisoner's Dilemma game with his
neighbors. A local trigger strategy equilibrium (LTSE) describes an
equilibrium in which each individual conditions his cooperation on the
cooperation of at least one \acceptable" group of neighbors. Our
main results demonstrate a basic tradeoff in the design problem between
suboptimal punishment and social con°ict. Potentially suboptimal punishment
arises in designs with local interactions since in this case monitoring
is imperfect. Due to heterogeneity of discount factors, however, greater
social conflict may arise in more connected networks. When residents'
discount factors are known to the planner, the optimal design exhibits
a cooperative "core" and an uncooperative "fringe."
Uncooperative (impatient) types are connected to cooperative ones who
tolerate their free riding so that social conflict is kept to a minimum.
By contrast, when residents' discount factors are iid, the optimal design
partitions individuals into maximally connected cliques (e.g., cul-de-sacs).
Optimal clique size increases the more patient an individual is likely
to be. Finally, if types are correlated, then incomplete graphs with
small overlap (e.g., grids) are possible. Möbius Markus
M [2000], The Formation of Ghettos as a Local Interaction Phenomenon,
Working Paper, MIT April 14, 2000 I
analyze a simple evolutionary model of residential segregation based
on decentralized racism which extends Schelling's (1972) well-known
tipping model by allowing for local interaction between residents. The
richer set-up explains not only the persistence of ghettos, but also
provides a mechanism for the rapid transition from an all-white to an
all-black equilibrium. On one-dimensional streets segregation arises
once a group becomes sufficiently dominant in the housing market. However,
the resulting ghettos are not persistent, and periodic shifts in the
market can give rise to "avenue waves". On two-dimensional
inner-cities, on the other hand, ghettos can be persistent due to the
\encircling phenomenon" if the majority ethnic group is sufficiently
less tolerant than the minority. I review the history of residential
segregation in the US and argue that my model can explain the rapid
rise of almost exclusively black ghettos at the beginning of the 20th
century. For the analysis of my model I introduce a new technique to
characterize the medium and long-run stochastic dynamics. I show that
clustering predicts the behavior of large-scale processes with many
agents more accurately than standard stochastic stability analysis,
because the latter concept overemphasizes the 'noisy' part of the stochastic
dynamics. Kandori Michihiroy
[2001], "Introduction to Repeated Games with Private Monitoring",
Working Paper, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo We
present a brief overview of recent developments on discounted repeated
games with (imperfect) private monitoring. The literature explores the
possibility of cooperation in a long-term relationship, where each agent
receives imperfect private information about the opponents’ actions.
Although this class of games admits a wide range of applications such
as collusion under secret price-cutting, exchange of goods with uncertain
quality, and observation errors, it has fairly complex mathematical
structure due to the lack of common information shared by players. This
is in sharp contrast to the well-explored case of repeated games under
public information (with the celebrated Folk Theorems), and until recently
little had been known about the private monitoring case. However, rapid
developments in the past few years have revealed the possibility of
cooperation under private monitoring for some class of games. Ely
Jeffrey [1996], "Local Conventions", Working Paper,
Department of Economics, Northwestern University It
is shown that player mobility has important consequences for the long-run
equilibrium distribution in dynamic evolutionary models of strategy
adjustment, when updating is prone to small probability perturbations,
i.e. "mistakes" or "mutations." Ellison (1993) concluded
that the effect on the matching process of localized "neighborhoods"
was to strengthen the stability of risk-dominant outcomes, originally
demonstrated by Kandori, Mailath, and Rob (1993) and Young (1993). I consider
a model in which players can choose the neighborhoods to which they
belong. When strategies and locations are updated simultaneously, only
efficient strategies survive and risk-dominance plays no special role.
The robustness of this conclusion is emphasized in a general locational
model in which strategy revision opportunities are allowed to arrive
at a faster rate than opportunities to change locations. The efficient
strategy persists in all cases in which the locational structure is
non-trivial. Moreover, even as revision rates become arbitrarily larger
than mobility rates, the efficient strategy occurs with boundedly positive
relative frequency. This demonstrates that the fixed location models
of KMR, Young, and Ellison are not close approximations when players
have any degree of mobility, however limited. Bowles S., Gintis H.
[2000], "Social Capital and Community Governance", Santa Fe
Institute Working Papers, http://www.santafe.edu/sfi/publications/01wplist.html Henrich Joseph,
Boyd Robert, Bowles Samuel, Camerer Colin, Fehr Ernst,
Gintis Herbert, McElreath Richard. [2001], "In Search of Homo Economicus:
Behavioral Experiments in 15 Small-Scale Societies", American
Economic Review, Vol. 91, No. 2, May 2001, pp.73-78. Henrich J., Boyd R.,
Bowles S., Camerer C., Fehr E., Gintis H., McElreath R.
[2001], "Cooperation, Reciprocity and Punishment in Fifteen Small-scale
Societies", Santa Fe Institute Working Paper, http://www.santafe.edu/sfi/publications/01wplist.html Recent
investigations have uncovered large, consistent deviations from the
predictions of the textbook representation of Homo Economicus: in addition
to their own material payoffs, many experimental subjects appear to
care about fairness and reciprocity and reward those who act in a cooperative
manner while punishing those who do not even when these actions are
costly to the individual. These deviations from what we will term the
canonical Economic Man model have important consequences for a wide
range of economic phenomena, including the optimal design of institutions
and contracts, the allocation of property rights, the conditions for
successful collective action, the analysis of incomplete contracts,
and the persistence of noncompetitive wage premia. However, existing
research is limited because virtually all subjects have been university
students: we would like to know how universal these behaviors are and
whether they vary with local cultural or economic environments. To address
these questions we and our collaborators (11 anthropologists and 1 economist)
conducted ultimatum, public good, and dictator game experiments with
subjects from fifteen hunter gatherer, nomadic herding and other small-scale
societies exhibiting a wide variety of economic and cultural conditions.
We can summarize our results as follows. First, the Economic Man model
is not supported in any society studied. Second, there is considerably
more behavioral variability across groups than had been found in previous
cross-cultural research and the canonical model fails in a wider variety
of ways than in previous experiments. Third, group-level differences
in the structure of everyday social interactions explain a substantial
portion of the behavioral variation across societies: the higher the
degree of market integration and the higher the payoffs to cooperation
in the production of their livelihood, the greater the level of cooperation
in experimental games. Fourth, individual-level economic and demographic
variables do not explain behavior either within or across groups. Fifth,
behavior in the experiments is generally consistent with economic patterns
of everyday life in these societies. Gintis Herbert [2001],
"The Hitchhiker's Guide to Altruism: Gene-Culture Coevolution and
the Internalization of Norms", Working Paper, http://www-unix.oit.umass.edu/~gintis/ The
internalization of norms refers to the tendency of human beings to adopt
social norms through the teaching of parents (vertical transmission)
or influential elders (oblique transmission). Authority rather than
fitness-enhancing capacity accounts for the adoption of internalized
norms. Suppose there is one genetic locus that controls whether or not
an individual is capable of internalizing norms. We extend the seminal
models of Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman (1981) to show that if adopting
a norm is fitness enhancing, the allele for internalization can evolve
to fixation. Moreover, even a small amount of biased vertical transmission
or oblique transmission renders fixation virtually inevitable. This
is Baldwin-like effect, because the gene for internalization, which
facilitates learning the fitness-enhancing trait, is incorporated into
the genome. We then add to the model a replicator dynamic (horizontal
transmission of fitness-enhancing phenotypic traits), showing that the
tendency of agents to switch from lower to higher-fitness norms enlarges
the basin of attraction of the internalization allele. Finally, we use
this framework to model analytically Herbert Simon's (1990) explanation
of altruism. Simon suggested that altruistic norms, which are by definition
fitness-reducing, could `hitchhike' on the general tendency of the internalization
of norms to be fitness-enhancing. We find that the altruistic phenotype
can evolve only if there is a sufficient level of oblique transmission,
even when there is a strong horizontal transmission process biased against
the altruistic norm. Bowles Samuel, Gintis H.
[2001], "Walrasian Economics in Retrospect", Working Paper
Two
basic tenets of the Walrasian model, behavior based on self-interested
exogenous preferences and complete and costless contracting have recently
come under critical scrutiny. First, social norms and psychological
dispositions extending beyond the selfish motives of Homo economicus
may have an important bearing on outcomes, even in competitive markets.
Second, market outcomes depend on strategic interactions in which power
in the political sense is exercised. It follows that economics must
become more psychological and more institutional, yet no less no less
dedicated to the construction of mathematical general economic equilibrium
models. Bowles Samuel, Gintis H.
[1998], The Moral Economy of Communities: Structured Populations and
the Evolution of Prosocial Norms, Evolution & Human Behavior http://www-unix.oit.umass.edu/~gintis/ We
model three mechanisms by which communities raise the net benefits to
individual pro-social behaviors: reputation, retaliation and segmentation.
Unlike most treatments of the evolution of group-beneficial traits our
communities promote pro-social behaviors independently of any process
of group selection. We further show that the restricted mobility associated
with communities (parochialism) enhances these mechanisms. Communities
may thus be considered to be surrogates for a system of efficiency enhancing
property and liability rights specifically adapted to informational
settings that make formal property rights systems untenable and preclude
the efficient centralized determination of outcomes. In short, communities
persist because they solve problems that markets and governments cannot
solve. Bowles S., Boyd R.,
Fehr E., Gintis H. [1997], "Homo Reciprocans: A Research Initiative
on the Origins, Dimensions, and Policy Implications of Reciprocal Fairness",
Working Paper http://www-unix.oit.umass.edu/~gintis/ Fehr Ernst and Peter K.
Zych [1998], "Intertemporal Choice under Habit Formation",
Handbook of Experimental Economic Results, http://www.iew.unizh.ch/home/fehr/ Many
of the most important choices in people’s lives have an inter-temporal
dimension, i.e., these choices are associated with a flow of benefits
or costs that accrue in the future. In addition, such choices are frequently
habit-forming. Yet, little is known about habit forming inter-temporal
choice behavior. This paper reports the results of an inter-temporal
choice experiment with habit-formation. Subjects’ choices deviate systematically
from individually optimal decisions in the direction of over-consumption.
This over-consumption is partly driven by loss avoidance, comparable
to a real life situation in which addicted people consume addictive
substances only in order to overpower withdrawal symptoms. Our results
thus reject the theory of rational addiction. Gintis H. [2002], "Solving
The Puzzle of Prosociality", Rationality and Society (forthcoming) http://www-unix.oit.umass.edu/~gintis/ Abstract Gintis
Herbert http://ideas.repec.org/p/wop/safiwp/01-10-059.html How
is cooperation among large numbers of unrelated individuals sustained?
Cooperation generally requires altruism, where individuals take actions
that are group-beneficial but personally costly. Why do selfish agents
not drive out altruistic behavior? This is the puzzle of prosociality.
Altruism is supported by culture. Sociology treats culture as a set
of norms that are transmitted by socialization institutions and internalized
by individuals. Altruism, in this approach, is thus sustained by the
internalization of norms. Biology treats culture as knowledge that is
passed to children from parents (vertical transmission), from other
prominent adults (oblique transmission), and from peers (horizontal
transmission), such that individuals with higher payoffs have a higher
level of biological fitness, leading norms to follow a dynamic of Darwinian
selection. Altruism, in this approach, can be sustained only if group
selection is feasible, which it rarely is. Economics uses evolutionary
game theory to model culture as strategies deployed in social interaction
that evolve according to a replicator dynamic, in which individuals
shift from lower to higher payoff norms. In this approach, altruism
cannot be sustained, but cooperation is possible with repeated interactions
and a sufficiently low discount rate. This paper integrates these approaches
and shows that altruism, as well as norms that reduce both individual
and group payoffs, can be supported in a stable equilibrium. Rajiv
Sethi Sethi R., Somanathan E.
[2002], “What can we learn from cultural group selection and co-evolutionary
models?”, Working Paper. Economists
have long operated on the assumption that the hypothesis of material
selfinterest is an adequate approximation to human motivation in economic
decision-making. This hypothesis has recently come under fierce challenge
from experimentalists, who have documented robust and systematic departures
from self-interest in controlled laboratory settings (see, for instance,
Fehr and Gächter, 2000). Rejection of self-interest as a governing hypothesis
does not, however, entail an embrace of altruism. Experimental subjects
tend to care about fairness and efficiency as well as their own self-interest,
but also reveal a strong propensity to reward generosity and punish
opportunism on the part of others. Such preferences for reciprocity
can indeed result in greater efficiency in some environments, but can
also reduce efficiency in others. For instance, reciprocity tends to
raise aggregate payoffs in public goods games with punishment,
while it lowers aggregate payoffs in ultimatum games. It is not pro-sociality
with which humans are endowed, but rather a predilection for reciprocity
which, given the right context, can have pro-social effects. It is the
predilection itself, rather than its consequences in particular environments,
that evolutionary models should account for. An important feature that
distinguishes preferences for reciprocity from altruistic preferences
is the fact that under rather general conditions, the presence of people
with such preferences, if observable, can induce opportunistic individuals
to act pro-socially. They do so at some cost to themselves, but avoid
the greater cost of being punished. The fact that the presence of reciprocators
in a group induces all group members to act pro-socially can allow preferences
for reciprocity to survive and spread in competition with self-interested
preferences even in the absence of assortative interaction. Fehr
E., Gächter S. [2000], “Fairness and Retaliation: The Economics of Reciprocity”, Journal
of Economic Perspectives 14: 159-181. Fehr E., Schmidt K.
[2000], “Fairness, Incentives and Contractual Choices”, European
Economic Review 44: 1057-1068. Gintis H. [2000]. “Strong
Reciprocity and Human Sociality”, Journal of Theoretical Biology,
206: 169-179. Guttman J.M. [2002],
“Repeated Interaction and the Evolution of Preferences for Reciprocity”,
Economic Journal, forthcoming. Richerson P.J., Boyd R.
[1999], “Complex Societies: The Evolutionary Origins of a Crude Superorganism”,
Human Nature, 10(3): 253-89. Rubin P.H., Somanathan E.
[1998], “Humans as factors of production: an evolutionary analysis”,
Managerial and Decision Economics 19: 441—455. Sethi R., Somanathan E.
[2001], “Norm Compliance and Strong Reciprocity”, Santa Fe Institute
Working Paper 01-09-048. Sethi R., Somanathan E.
[2001], “Preference Evolution and Reciprocity”, Journal of Economic
Theory 97: 273—297. Sethi R., Somanathan E.
[2001], “Norm Compliance and Strong Reciprocity”, Santa Fe Institute
Working Paper 01-09-048. Abstract Sethi R., Somanathan E.
[2002], “Understanding Reciprocity”, Forthcoming: Journal of Economic
Behavior and Organization Abstract Axelrod R., Hamilton W.D.,
[1981], "The evolution of cooperation", Science, 211,
1390-1396. Axelrod R., [1984],
The evolution of cooperation, Basic Books, New York Axelrod R. [1986],
"An evolutionary approach to norms", American Political
Science Review, 80, 1095-111. James
C. Cox Cox J.C. [2000],
Implications of Game Triads for Observations of Trust and Reciprocity,
Working Paper. Abstract:
cf. le jeu d'investissement de Berg, Dickhaut and McCabe
(1995) : Joyce Berg, John
Dickhaut, Kevin McCabe Richerson P.J. and
R. Boyd [1998], "The Evolution of Human Ultra-Sociality",
In: Ideology, Warfare, and Indoctrinability, I. Eibl-Eibisfeldt
and F. Salter, eds. pp. 71–95, Berghan Books, 1998 http://www.sscnet.ucla.edu/anthro/faculty/boyd/Publications.htm Henrich J. and R. Boyd
[1998], "The Evolution of Conformist Transmission and the Emergence
of Between-Group Differences", Evolution and Human Behavior,
19: 215–242. 1998. http://www.sscnet.ucla.edu/anthro/faculty/boyd/Publications.htm Unlike
other animal species, much of the variation among human groups is cultural:
genetically similar people living in similar environments exhibit strikingly
different patterns of behavior because they have different, culturally
acquired beliefs and values. Such cultural transmission is based on
complex, derived psychological mechanisms that are likely to have been
shaped by natural selection. It is important to understand the nature
of these evolved psychological mechanisms because they determine which
beliefs and values spread and persist in human groups. Boyd and Richerson
(1985) showed that a tendency to acquire the most common behavior exhibited
in a society was adaptive in a simple model of evolution in a spatially
varying environment because such a tendency increases the probability
of acquiring adaptive beliefs and values. Here, we study the evolution
of such "conformist transmission" in a more general model
in which environments vary in both time and space. The analysis of this
model indicates that conformist transmission is favored under a very
broad range of conditions, broader in fact than the range of conditions
that favor a substantial reliance on social learning. The analysis also
suggests that there is a synergistic relationship between the evolution
of imitation and the evolution of conformism. We conclude by examining
the role of conformism in explaining the maintenance of cultural differences
among groups. Richerson P.J. and
R. Boyd [1999], The Evolutionary Dynamics of a Crude Super Organism,
Human Nature, 10: 253–289, 1999. http://www.sscnet.ucla.edu/anthro/faculty/boyd/Publications.htm The
complexity of human societies of the past few thousand years rivals
that of social insect societies. We hypothesize that two sets of social
“instincts” underpin and constrain the evolution of complex societies.
One set is ancient and shared with other social primate species, and
one is derived and unique to our lineage. The latter evolved by the
late Pleistocene, and led to the evolution of institutions of intermediate
complexity in acephalous societies. The institutions of complex societies
often conflict with our social instincts. The complex societies of the
last few thousand years can function only because cultural evolution
has created effective “work-arounds” to manage such instincts. We describe
a series of work-arounds and use the data on the relative effectiveness
of WWII armies to test the work-around hypothesis. Samuel Bowles S.,
Gintis H. [2002], "The Origins of Human Cooperation", Working
Paper, Santa Fe Institute. http://www.santafe.edu/sfi/publications/wpabstract/200208035 Abstract:
Samuel Bowles S.,
Gintis H. [2002], " Prosocial Emotions ", Working Paper,
Santa Fe Institute. http://www.santafe.edu/sfi/publications/wpabstract/200207028 http://www.sscnet.ucla.edu/soc/faculty/kollock/ Kollock Peter [1994], "The
Emergence of Exchange Structures: An Experimental Study of Uncertainty,
Commitment, and Trust", American Journal of Sociology 100(2):313-345. Kollock Peter [1998a], "Social
Dilemmas: The Anatomy of Cooperation", Annual Review of Sociology
24:183-214. Kollock Peter [1998b], "The
Economies of Online Cooperation: Gifts and Public Goods in Computer
Communities", in Communities in Cyberspace, edited by Marc
Smith and Peter Kollock. London: Routledge. Kollock Peter [1998c], "The
Production of Trust in Online Markets", Working paper, UCLA, final
version to appear in Advances in Group Processes (Vol. 16), edited
by E. J. Lawler, M. Macy, S. Thyne, and H. A. Walker Greenwich,
CT: JAI Press. 1999. Authors:
Stefano Battiston, Eric Bonabeau, Gerard Weisbuch Battiston S.,
Bonabeau E., Weisbuch G. [2002], "Decision making dynamics
in corporate boards", Working Paper. Abstract Maurice Godelier Godelier
M. [1996], L'énigme du don, Fayard, Paris (1996). Marcel Mauss Mauss M.
[1925], "Essai sur le don. Forme et raison de l’échange dans les
sociétés primitives", Les PUF, Paris, 1968. Coll. Bibliothèque de
sociologie contemporaine, publication originale : l'Année Sociologique,
1, 1925. http://www.uqac.uquebec.ca/zone30/Classiques_des_sciences_sociales/index.html Annette Weiner Weiner A. [1992], Inalienable
Possessions: The Paradox of Keeping-while-Giving, Berkeley, University
of California Press, 1992 Bronislaw Malinowski Malinowski B. [1921], "The
Primitive Economy of the Trobriand Islanders", Economic Journal,
Vol.31, N°121, mars 1921 Jerry and Edmund Leach Leach J. and E. [1983], The
Kula: New Perspectives on Massim Exchange, Cambridge University Press,
1983. Kula
entre les îles Trobriand, Woodlark, Gawa, Vakuta, Kitawa, Normanby, Tubetube,
Louisiade, Rossel Island Objets précieux (kitomu) servant au
kula (mais servant aussi à d'autres usages, comme monnaie sauf dans certaines
îles comme Kiriwina, où ils ne servent qu'au kula): bracelets (mwali)
et colliers (soulava). Ces objets initient des relations, en
particulier des relations matrimoniales (île Woodlark). Ils servent aux
échanges cérémoniels (après le décès d'un homme). Route du kula : le bracelet est
donné (en tant qu'objet kula), il passe de main en main jusqu'à ce qu'il
parvienne dans celle de quelqu'un qui possède un collier de rang équivalent.
Il fait l'échange et le collier voyage en sens inverse jusqu'à revenir
après plusieurs mois ou années à l'émetteur. Le périple du kula est achevé
et le collier peut sortir du cycle kula. Aux deux bouts de la chaîne,
il y a propriété, les autres ont les objets à titre de prêt (don devant
être compensé plus tard par un contre-don). Que gagne l'émetteur ? Annette
Weiner (pas l'objet kula, de même valeur) mais la renommé et des cadeaux
ou dons que lui valent son habileté à négocier (les relations commerciales
qu'il a ainsi initiées et qui sont le canal d'échanges commerciaux). Terence
C. Burnham, Burnham T.C. [2003],
"Engineering altruism: a theoretical and experimental investigation
of anonymity and gift giving", Journal of Economic Behavior &
Organization, Volume 50, Issue 1, January 2003, Pages 133-144. Abstract
http://webuser.bus.umich.edu/henrich/